The Desert…
As promised here is the revised version of my paper, entitled “A Problem in Light of Axiology”….
Since the beginning of time mankind has been instilled with moral reasoning, that regardless of beliefs, both religious and impious, have guided our actions. For centuries the greatest philosophical minds have studied this reasoning, and out of this study has emerged the area of philosophy known as axiology.
It can be logically implied that axiology is the area of philosophy that deals with reasoning, but this is only the tip of the iceberg. Axiology, by definition, is the branch of philosophy dealing with values, as those of ethics, aesthetics, or religion (Dictionary). Cohen states that “broadly interpreted, [axiology] includes such areas as ethical theory, social and political philosophy, and aesthetics” (4). Cohen goes on to say that in ethical theory basic questions about moral values are examined. Like wise, in social and political philosophy, questions pertaining to, as the name implies, social and political values, are raised in dealing with problems involving “just or equitable treatment of individuals in society” (4). These two ideas separate may lead in two different lines of reasoning, but together they form the cornerstone of axiology, viz: moral values are examined and these values directly effect decisions that we make that involve the “equitable treatment of individuals in society” (4). This goes a long way to say that axiology, in its simplest form, deals with the virtue of mankind.
But then if axiology deals with the virtue of mankind, then what is virtue. Aristotle explains virtue as:
Being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of a habit, whence also its name ethike is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word ethos (habit). Aristotle (79)
Essentially virtue, according to Aristotle, is split into two different areas—moral and intellectual, both having a different foundation. But this as some might note is not an explanation but merely realization that virtue comes in two types. We must concede that virtue is a “state of character concerned with choice” (Aristotle 83).
The conclusions made by Aristotle I believe lays out an appropriate and solid argument. But how can one argue that virtue is not affected by ones surroundings, when it is all that mankind is subjected to? One thing I do find objective is the idea that moral virtue comes by habit. By definition virtue is “moral excellence, goodness, righteousness” (Dictionary). If this is so, then habit can not be the barer of moral virtue. What if we say that one has made a habit of murder, then would it suffice to say that this is morally virtuous? I feel one would have a hard time arguing such a point; this then, could bleed into intellectual virtue as well. If one is instructed in the art of murder, then would it serve to say that this is virtuous? After all, murder does owe its birth and growth to teaching. Aristotle address this issue stating that “actions of adultery, theft, murder; for all of these and suchlike things imply by their names that they are themselves bad” (83). This statement gives rise to yet another problem, with the word “suchlike”. If virtue is determined in part by ones surroundings, then would it not stand to reason that virtue is different for every man? We then would have to say that if in ones surroundings, murder was not considered a heinous crime, but instead taught and that the perfection thereof is the direct result of habit, must it then be virtuous? If for one man “suchlike” differs for another man, would we not run into a problem? The easiest solution to this problem is to understand that virtue is the “state of character concerned with choice”. This choice is relative to us and is determined by a rational principle (Aristotle 83). This character is our virtue, and this concern is our conscience. This idea eliminates the problem of the differing “suchlike” among mankind, as the term would be inerrant and fundamentally the same for all. To encompass this idea into one statement, virtue is of two types, but both deal with the idea that virtue is ultimately a character concerned choice, which is determined by the conscience.
This idea might still seem a little far reaching even stretching the limits of imagination, but by bringing it into a new light perhaps the idea will seem more acceptable. To do this we will consider the question of whether a lawyer can be successful and be virtuous at the same time. Of course the first question should be what is success and what is virtue? Virtue has previously been defined as a character concerned choice and, success refers to the idea that your client, or whoever you represent, is antiquated. The question now is, can a lawyer be virtuous, both morally and intellectually, and at the same time be successful? The most immediate problem is also the greatest: is the lawyers responsibility ultimately to be virtuous or to be successful. The answer is not a simple one, but I would argue that in order to be successful, one must be virtuous.
How then can we apply the area of axiology to this problem? Consider this first—murder is commonly accepted as wrong and as such it should be punished. If then you know that, or at least suspect, that your client is guilty, is it not then your virtue that would say to let him be punished? But taking this a step further would it not be even harder knowing this, to aid him in acquittal? In which case, would it not stand to reason that one must forgo success in order to be virtuousness—perhaps not. Now recall, axiology deals with the just or equitable treatment of individuals in society. I might highlight that this principle of just treatment gives no stipulation to whether someone is guilty or not. Would it not stand to reason then that all men, according to axiology, deserve just or equitable treatment? Then accordingly, could we not say that it is not only proper but virtuous that all mankind be given the just treatment? If axiology deals with virtue, and virtue being only good, then should not every man be given just treatment? To deny one, is to deny the other. So therefore in order to be virtuous every effort must be made to be successful.
In closing I will state that I in no way claim to have the formula for this problem, nor that my conclusions will be accepted. This argument has been raging since the art of law has been founded, and I expect that it will continue for some time to come. I do feel, however, that only when we begin to look at the problem with a new outlook, will a solution present itself; that is all I offer—perspective.
I will add the works cited page later…
KW
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